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So far I have not seen a good argument for the existence of God. This
observation is, in turn, a good argument against the existence of God.
(Hanson (1971))
Abstract
We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain con-
ditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis
H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.
1 Introduction
Consider the following familiar argument schemes:
• There is no good argument for the existence of God, so I am an atheist.
• You can’t prove that my client is guilty, so I believe that she is innocent.
• There is no good reason to think that leaving the fan on overnight is
dangerous, so I’ll leave it on.
Although arguments of this type are commonly used in a wide range of
reasoning contexts, it is far from clear how they can be accounted for in
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the context of standard Bayesian epistemology. For, there is no canonical
mechanism for updating on the absence of relevant evidence. In this article,
we show that these arguments are structurally isomorphic to the ‘no alter-
natives arguments’ recently analysed by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger
(2015), and so can, in certain circumstances, be given a fully Bayesian vin-
dication in the same way.
2 No Alternatives
According to the traditional Bayesian paradigm, scientific theories are as-
sessed in the light of relevant empirical data (see, e.g., Howson and Urbach
(2005)). In recent years there has been much debate concerning how the-
ories can be evaluated in the absence of such data. In particular, it is
well known that some theories of contemporary fundamental physics are
extremely far from being empirically testable (Dawid (2013)). This situa-
tion motivates the idea that theories can also be assessed in the absence of
empirical data. Towards this end, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger (2015)
(henceforth DHS) consider the ‘no alternatives argument’ (NAA), which has
the following form:
P1: Theory or hypothesis H satisfies several desirable conditions.
P2: Despite a lot of effort, the scientific community has not yet found an
alternative to H that also satisfies these conditions.
C: Hence we have one good reason in favor of H.
DHS note that NAA type arguments play a prominent role in contem-
porary physics, and so should be taken seriously (though not uncritically
accepted without further inspection) by students of scientific epistemology.
Crucially for our purposes, they also show that these arguments can be faith-
fully represented in a Bayesian setting, once one countenances the possibility
of non-empirical evidence.1
1We submit that the term “non-empirical evidence” might be misleading. A better term is
perhaps “indirect evidence” which is evidence that does not follow deductively or inductively
from the hypothesis under consideration. Clearly P2 represents empirical evidence, but it is
indirect as the failure of the scientific community to come up with an alternative is typically not
a deductive consequence of the hypothesis in question.
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Let F be the proposition ‘the scientific community has not yet found an
alternative to the hypothesis H’. The idea is to show that F confirms H,
i.e. that P (H|F) > P (H), where P is the subjective probability distribution
of some agent. Furthermore, let Y be a propositional variable that has the
values Yi for each integer i ≥ 0.2 We interpret Yi as the proposition ‘there
exist i possible alternatives to H’. Intuitively, scientists will have prior beliefs
about the values of Y . For example, it might be that although a scientist
has not yet found an alternative to H, she is certain that there is one, and
so she will assign Y0 a prior probability of 0. Generally though, scientists
may be uncertain about whether or not alternatives exist, and if so, how
many.
Next, it seems plausible that one’s prior belief in H should scale inversely
with the number of alternative theories. If there is no alternative to H,
that should render H maximally likely. If however H is only one of many
competing theories, all of which do the job, then H will be less believable.
The probability that H is true will certainly not go up if more alternatives
become available. It also seems reasonable that the more alternatives to H
there are, the more likely the scientific community will be to find one. It
will certainly not become less likely that the scientific community finds an
alternative if more alternatives become available. Finally, DHS note that
knowledge of the value of Y renders F probabilistically independent of H:
If a scientist knows that there are, say, five alternatives to H (even without
knowing what these theories are), the fact that the scientific community
hasn’t found one of them yet doesn’t tell us anything new about whether
or not H is true. F is only relevant to H when we are uncertain about the
value of Y . These considerations can be summarised by the following four
conditions:
NAA1: ∀i ≥ 0, yi := P (Yi) ∈ [0, 1).
NAA2: hi := P (H|Yi) are monotonically decreasing in i.
NAA3: fi := P (F|Yi) are monotonically decreasing in i.
NAA4: H and F are conditionally independent on Y , i.e. P (H|Yi,F) =
P (H|Yi).
2Note that we represent propositional variables in italic script and their values in roman
script. See Bovens and Hartmann (2003).
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Armed with these conditions, DHS prove the following theorem:3
Theorem 1 Let P be a probability distribution satisfying the conditions
NAA1 – NAA4. Then F confirms H, i.e. P (H|F) > P (H), if there exists a
pair (i, j) with i > j such that (i) yi yj > 0, (ii) fi < fj, and (iii) hi < hj.
Note that the justification for the existence of a pair (i, j) satisfying the
conditions (i) to (iii) is essentially the same as the motivation for NAA1 to
NAA3. Condition (i) requires that we are uncertain about whether there
are i or j many alternatives to H. Condition (ii) says that we are more likely
to have found an alternative to H if there exist i alternatives than we are if
there exist j alternatives, where i > j. Similarly, (iii) says that H is more
likely to be true when there are j alternatives than it is when there are i
alternatives, where i > j. We only require the existence of one pair (i, j)
satisfying these three conditions.
So under some weak and intuitive conditions, the NAA works and sci-
entific theories can be confirmed in this way.
3 No Reason For Is a Reason Against
Now consider the proposition H: ‘God exists’, and suppose that we are
uncertain about the truth of H. Let F be the proposition ‘I have not yet
found a good argument in favour of H’, and let Y be a propositional variable
whose values are the propositions Yi : ‘There are exactly i good arguments
in favour of H’ (0 ≤ i). Again, it seems clear that agents can generally
be uncertain about the value of Y . Many rational agents would surely
plead ignorance as to whether or not there exist any undiscovered good
argument for the existence of God (and if so, how many). Again, knowledge
of the value of Y renders F independent of H: If I know that there are ten
good arguments in favour of the existence of God, the fact that I haven’t
yet found any one of them yet should be irrelevant to my belief in God’s
existence. Furthermore, if I learn that there are more good arguments for
God’s existence than I previously thought, that should raise my degree of
belief in the existence of God. Finally, the more arguments there are for
3Actually, this is a slightly simplified version of the theorem proven by DHS. The proof
proceeds accordingly.
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God’s existence, the more likely it is that I find one. (At least the probability
that God exists does not go down if more arguments become available.) As
before, these considerations give rise to the following basic conditions:
NRF1: ∀i ≥ 0, yi := P (Yi) ∈ [0, 1).
NRF2: hi := P (H|Yi) are monotonically increasing in i.
NRF3: fi := P (F|Yi) are monotonically decreasing in i.
NRF4: H and F are conditionally independent on Y , i.e. P (H|Y,F) =
P (H|Y).
NRF1–4 are structurally near-identical to the conditions imposed on the
NAA argument. The only difference is that the hi are now monotonically
increasing in i. The proof for the following theorem is exactly analogous to
that used by DHS for Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 Let P be a probability distribution satisfying the conditions
NRF1−−4. Then F disconfirms H, i.e. P (H|F) < P (H), if there exists a
pair (i, j) with i > j such that (i) yi yj > 0, (ii) fi > fj, and (iii) hi < hj.
We contend that Theorem 2 constitutes, under certain special circum-
stances, a full Bayesian vindication of ‘no reason for is a reason against’
arguments (henceforth ‘NRF’s’) of the type advocated, for example, by
Hanson (1971) and mentioned at the beginning of this article. We turn
now to clarifying and preemptively defending this claim against a potential
objection.
The most pressing criticism of NRF type arguments under our analysis is
that they can equally be used against both a hypothesis H and its negation
¬H. For example, just as one can use an absence of arguments in favour of
God’s existence to argue for her non-existence, it is equally legitimate to use
the absence of arguments for God’s non-existence to argue for her existence.
And NRF type arguments are only really interesting in cases in which there
are no arguments supporting either H or ¬H. So if they can’t distinguish
between H and ¬H in these cases, it is hard to see how they could ever be
useful.
We agree that this kind of criticism places an important and strong
restriction on the applicability of NRF arguments. If an agent considers
only the fact that they have not yet encountered a good argument in favour
of H but ignores the fact that they have not yet encountered a good argument
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against H, then they will generally be guilty of selective epistemic vision.
They will have reached a conclusion without considering all of the relevant
evidence. And indeed, one might contend that this constitutes a fatal flaw
in Hanson’s (1971) reasoning.
However, it should also be noted that there are particular kinds of rea-
soning contexts where although the agent does have beliefs about possible
arguments in favour of H, they do not have beliefs about possible arguments
against H. For example, consider the judge of a murder case in which the
suspect has an unverifiable alibi.4 The judge would remind the jury that
the suspect is innocent until proven guilty. This means that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution rather than the defence. Given the unverifia-
bility of the suspect’s alibi, the jury is explicitly admonished to ignore the
absence of arguments against the suspect’s guilt, and concentrate only on
the possible arguments in favour of their guilt. In cases like this, where the
agent suspends belief about the possible arguments against the truth of H,
NRF type arguments can legitimately be used in support of H, but not in
support of ¬H.
Returning to the theological example, Hanson writes:
‘[A] proof of X’s non-existence’ usually derives from the fact that
there is no good reason for supposing that X does exist. Since
there is no good reason whatever for supposing that green goblins
do exist, that fact is normally what is meant by reference to the
‘proof’ that green goblins do not exist. (Hanson 1971: 311)
Thus, according to Hanson, there is a basic epistemic a-symmetry between
positive and negative existential claims. For Hanson, an argument against
a negative existential claim is just an observation to the effect that there
are no good arguments in favour of the corresponding positive existential
claim. If this is right, then an agent who only considers arguments in favour
of God’s existence really is considering all the relevant evidence, since there
are no independent arguments against God’s existence. Of course, this is a
controversial position relating to complex theological issues concerning, for
example, whether God’s existence/non-existence is a contingent or analytic
matter. But if one buys the conjectured a-symmetry between positive and
4Suppose for example that the suspect claimed to be at home on the night of the murder,
and to have had no contact with anybody all night etc.
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negative existential claims, then it looks like Hanson’s NRF style arguments
can be legitimately applied.
The crucial point is that there do seem to be particular kinds of reasoning
scenarios in which agents are permitted (or even required) to only consider
possible arguments in favour of the considered hypothesis H, and ignore
potential arguments against H. In those special cases, it is possible to give
a fully Bayesian justification of the application of NRF style arguments.
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